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Equality of Opportunity, Cultural Diversity and  
Claims for Fairness
Mitja Sardoč1
• The present paper examines some of the tensions, problems and chal-
lenges associated with claims for equality of opportunity (the fairness 
argument). The introductory part identifies three separate forms of jus-
tification for public education, including the argument associated with 
equality of opportunity. Part II examines in detail two questions that 
reveal part of the anatomy of equality of opportunity: (1) what an op-
portunity is, and (2) when individuals’ opportunities are equal. This is 
followed by a presentation of the two basic principles of equality of op-
portunity: (1) the principle of non-discrimination, and (2) the “levelling 
the playing field” principle. The next part takes up the multiculturalist 
hypothesis advanced by minority groups for the accommodation and 
recognition of cultural diversity. This is followed by the identification 
of a set of claims comprising the “fairness argument”. The last section 
focuses on the “currency problem” associated with cultural diversity 
as a form of “unfair disadvantage”. Part V examines two of the major 
shortcomings associated with the multicultural conception of equality 
of opportunity, while the concluding part discusses some of the ques-
tions that must be answered by any conception of equal opportunities.
 Keywords: equality of opportunity, opportunity, equality, cultural 
diversity, the fairness argument, multiculturalism, education 
1 Educational Research Institute, Slovenia; mitja.sardoc@pei.si.
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Enake možnosti, kulturna različnost in  
zahteve pravičnosti
Mitja Sardoč
• Prispevek obravnava nekatere izmed napetosti problemov in izzivov, 
ki so povezani z zahtevo po zagotavljanju enakih možnosti [argu-
ment poštenosti]. Uvodni del poudari tri ločene utemeljitve javnega 
izobraževanja, vključno z utemeljitvijo, ki je povezana z zagotavljanjem 
enakih možnosti. Drugi del podrobneje obravnava dve vprašanji, ki raz-
krivata del anatomije enakih možnosti, in sicer i) kar je priložnost in 
ii) kdaj so priložnosti posameznikov enake. Temu sledi še predstavitev 
dveh osnovnih načel zagotavljanja enakih možnosti, in sicer i) načelo 
nediskriminiranja in ii) načelo »izenačitve igralnega polja«. Sledi anali-
za hipoteze multikulturalizma po pripoznanju kulturne raznolikosti, ki 
jo zagovarjajo manjšinske skupine. Temu sledi opredelitev sklopa trd-
itev, ki sestavljajo t. i. »argument poštenosti« ter analizo t. i. »problema 
valute«, ki je povezana z utemeljitvijo kulturne raznolikosti kot oblike 
»nepoštene prikrajšanosti«. Peti del obravnava dve glavni pomanjkljiv-
osti, ki sta povezani z multikulturnim pojmovanjem enakih možnosti. 
Sklepni del identificira nekatera izmed osnovnih vprašanj, na katera 
mora odgovoriti vsako pojmovanje enakih možnosti.
 Ključne besede: : enake možnosti, priložnost, enakost, kulturna 
različnost, argument poštenosti, multikulturalizem, vzgoja in 
izobraževanje 
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Equality of opportunity:  
some preliminary considerations2
Over the last few decades, discussions about public education have been 
centred around the three separate functions that public education carries out 
in contemporary societies: (1) the identity-related function; (2) the knowledge-
related function, and (3) the status-related function. Each of the three aspects 
performs a distinctive function. The dominant feature of the first function is 
largely socio-integrative, as it links public education with the establishment of 
the “national” character of a population (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). As Er-
nest Gellner emphasises, “education is by far his most precious investment, and 
in effect confers his identity on him” (Gellner, 1983, p. 36), adding that the mo-
nopoly over public education has become, “more important than the monopoly 
of legitimate violence” (ibid., p. 33). The second basic function carried out by 
public education focuses on its role as an “ideological state apparatus” (Althuss-
er, 2014). As part of this function, its basic role is to reproduce existing relations 
of production. The central role played here is by “official knowledge”. As Mi-
chael W. Apple emphasises, [w]hat counts as knowledge, the ways in which it is 
organized, who is empowered to teach it, what counts as an appropriate display 
of having learned it, and – just as critically – who is allowed to ask and answer 
all of these questions are part and parcel of how dominance and subordination 
are reproduced and altered in this society. There is, then, always a politics of 
official knowledge, a politics that embodies conflict over what some regard as 
simply neutral descriptions of the world and others regard as elite conceptions 
that empower some groups while disempowering others. (Apple, 1993, p. 222)
This function is based on the assumption that public education serves 
as a primary tool in the reproduction of existing social relations related to the 
reproduction of an existing social order. The third function of public education 
focuses on the provision of equal opportunities in the process of competition 
for advantaged social positions to all individuals irrespective of their social or 
cultural background, gender, race, creed, national origin, physical and men-
tal constitution, etc. As John Rawls states, those who have the same level of 
talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the 
same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the class into 
which they are born and develop until the age of reason. (Rawls, 2001, p. 44)
From the perspective of justice, it is the latter function that is crucial, 
as the individual’s social status and social mobility depend largely on his/her 
2 Parts of this paper are based on a couple of papers published in Slovene language (Sardoč 2013a, 
2013b).
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success in the process of education. Equal (educational) opportunities – so 
their advocates argue – are one of the basic mechanisms for a fair distribution 
of advantaged social positions and the related social mobility. The importance 
of providing equality of opportunity within public education has therefore 
achieved a kind of a general consensus among both experts and policy mak-
ers (Husén, 1975). In fact, equality of opportunity has been at the very heart 
of various discussions about public education (Brighouse, 2007, 2010; Howe, 
1989; Jencks 1988). This is evidenced by the fact that a key survey on equal 
educational opportunities (The Equality of Educational Opportunity Study), 
the so-called “Coleman Report”, has been generally accepted – as pointed out 
by Geoffrey Borman and Maritza Dowling – as the single “most significant re-
search on schooling, which has ever been conducted” (Borman & Dowling, 
2010). Since its publication, the analysis of equality of opportunity – as Torsten 
Husén pointed out – has been “raised to a higher level of sophistication” (Husén, 
1975, p. 18).
As in other scholarly discussions, opinions regarding the role, importance 
and effects of equality of opportunity remain largely divided. On the one hand, 
there are those who place the idea of equality of opportunity alongside other 
classical liberal ideas, such as justice, freedom and tolerance. As Charles Frankel 
emphasises, equality of opportunity occupies “a central role in the pantheon of 
modern political ideals” (Frankel, 1971, p. 193).3 Nevertheless, the idea of equal-
ity of opportunity is far from being either unquestionable or unproblematic. For 
example, John Rawls defines it as a “difficult and not altogether clear idea” (Rawls, 
2001, p. 43). In fact, the only solid assumption that different conceptions of equal-
ity of opportunity share, as Richard Arneson points out (2002), is their rejection 
of fixed social relations, not a rejection of hierarchy itself.
The main aim of the present paper is to identify some of the basic con-
troversies dominating the discussion regarding equality of opportunity. It con-
sists of four sections. Part II examines in detail two questions associated with 
the anatomy of equal opportunities: (1) what an opportunity is, and (2) when 
individuals’ opportunities are equal. This is followed by a presentation of the 
two basic principles of equal opportunities: (1) the principle of non-discrimina-
tion, and (2) the “levelling the playing field” principle. Part III takes up the mul-
ticulturalist invocation of equality of opportunity. The first section presents the 
standard multiculturalist hypothesis for the accommodation and recognition 
of cultural diversity. This is followed by an identification of a set of claims com-
posing the “fairness argument”. The focus then shifts to the “currency problem” 
3 For a historical overview of changes in the concept of equal opportunities, see Gomberg (2007, pp. 
2–5) and Husén (1975 (Chapter 1)).
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associated with cultural diversity as a form of “unfair disadvantage”. Part V ex-
amines two of the major shortcomings associated with the multicultural con-
ception of equality of opportunity, while the concluding part discusses some of 
the questions that must be answered by any conception of equal opportunities.
The anatomy of equal opportunities
The basic premise of any conception of equal opportunities is that indi-
viduals’ opportunities in the process of competing for advantaged social posi-
tions should be equal. Despite the clear-cut message of this idea, a basic ques-
tion arises: When are individuals’ opportunities equal? In order to answer this 
question, it is first necessary to provide an adequate response to the substantive 
question: “What is an opportunity?”. Without further clarification of this con-
cept and its basic characteristics, the question of when individuals’ opportuni-
ties are equal cannot adequately be addressed. In fact, as Sven Ove Hansson 
emphasises, discussions on equality of opportunity have often been “hampered 
by insufficient attention to the very notion of opportunity itself ” (Hansson, 
2004, p. 315). Any discussion regarding equality of opportunity therefore needs 
to address two separate – but interrelated – questions: (1) What is an opportu-
nity? (substantive question), and (2) When are individuals’ opportunities equal? 
(referential question).4
What is an opportunity?
Any conception of equal opportunities, as Peter Westen points out, con-
sists of four basic elements: (1) agent or agents of equal opportunities, (2) objec-
tive or objectives to which equal opportunities are directed, (3) the relationship 
between the agent and the objective of equal opportunities, and (4) obstacles 
to the realisation of equal opportunities (Westen, 1997, pp. 837–838). The first 
element primarily brings together the individuals who are entitled to equal 
treatment, which implies – at least formally – the same conditions. The second 
aspect, as Peter Westen emphasises, defines the objective of the opportunities, 
which can be “a job, or an education, or medical care, or a political office, or 
land to settle, or housing, or a financial investment, or a military promotion, or 
a life of ‘culture’, or the development of natural ability or whatever” (ibid., 1997, 
4 This distinction is an invaluable tool for identifying differences between various conceptions 
of equal opportunities. For example, the difference between egalitarian and multicultural 
conceptions primarily revolves around the substantive question (What is an “opportunity”?), 
whereas the difference between egalitarian and libertarian conceptions of equal opportunities 
revolves around the referential question (When are individuals’ opportunities equal?).
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p. 838). The third element (the relationship between the agent and the objective 
of opportunities) is not yet a guarantee that the objective of equal opportunities 
will be achieved.
The concept of opportunity may therefore be defined in two separate 
ways: (1) as the absence of obstacles to the attainment of a particular objective 
(negative justification) and (2) as the ability of an individual to attain a par-
ticular goal using his or her efforts (positive justification). An opportunity, as 
Peter Westen states, “is a chance of an agent X, to choose to attain a goal, Y, 
Z without the hindrance of obstacle Z” (Westen, 1985, p. 849) or – as Alan H. 
Goldman argues – “the lack of some obstacle or obstacles to the attainment of 
some goal(s) or benefit(s)” (Goldman, 1987, p. 88).5 Having an opportunity, as 
Brian Barry claims, means that “there is some course of action lying within my 
power such that it will lead, if I choose to take it, to my doing or obtaining the 
thing in question” (Barry, 2005, p. 37). At the same time, opportunity has also 
been closely linked to the issue of the risk an individual is exposed to when 
aiming to achieve a particular goal. In fact, as John Roemer emphasises, the 
individual is actually “responsible for turning that access into actual advantage 
by the application of effort” (Roemer, 1998, p. 24). If an individual is responsible 
for the outcome of the process of competing for advantaged social positions, it 
is therefore necessary to ensure that only those factors an individual may be re-
sponsible for should be taken into account. This is consistent with the “control 
principle”, as articulated by Thomas Nagel (Nagel, 1979). So: When are indi-
viduals’ opportunities equal?
Equality of opportunity
As a form of “fair competition among individuals for unequal positions 
in society” (Fishkin, 1983, p. 1), the idea of equality of opportunity is composed 
of two separate and allegedly incompatible principles: (1) the principle of non-
discrimination, and (2) the principle of levelling the playing field.
Equality of opportunity and non-discrimination
The principle of non-discrimination gives every individual equal ac-
cess to advanced social positions, irrespective of any morally arbitrary factors 
such as gender, social and cultural background, religion, national origin, physi-
cal and mental constitution, etc. In this regard, as Lesley A. Jacob points out, 
5 For a detailed presentation of the different dimensions of the concept of opportunity (e.g., 
openness), see Hansson (2004). 
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at the very centre of understanding equal opportunities lies a concept that in 
competitive procedures designed for the allocation of scarce resources and the 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life, those procedures should 
be governed by criteria that are relevant to the particular goods at stake in the 
competition and not by irrelevant considerations such as race, religion, class, 
gender, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or other factors that may hinder 
some of the competitors’ opportunities at success. (Jacobs, 2004, p. 10)
The principle of non-discrimination therefore ensures that the set of po-
tential candidates includes “all individuals who possess the attributes relevant 
for the performance of the duties of the position in question, [...] and that an 
individual’s possible occupancy of the position be judged only with respect to 
those relevant attributes” (Roemer, 1998, p. 1). By choosing candidates exclu-
sively on the basis of merit, as George Sher argues, we abstract from all facts 
about the applicants except their ability to perform well at the relevant tasks. By 
thus concentrating on their ability to perform, we treat them as agents whose 
purposeful acts are capable of making a difference in the world . . . [S]electing 
by merit is a way of taking seriously the potential agency of both the successful 
and the unsuccessful applicants. (Sher, 1988, pp. 119–120)
According to this interpretation, as James Fishkin emphasises, “the 
assignment of persons to unequal positions according to a fair competition” 
(Fishkin, 1983, p. 6) is fulfilled as long as three basic conditions are met:
(1)  each individual should have equal access to the process of competition 
for advantaged social positions;
(2) the rules are (a) the same for everyone, (b) known in advance, and (c) 
connected to the process of competition for advantaged social positions 
(e.g., carrying out a particular task or performing a job);
(3)  the best/most qualified candidate wins.6
6 The difference between libertarian and egalitarian conceptions of equal opportunities also 
concerns the validity of the underlying assumptions of the idea of equal opportunities, i.e., that 
“the best candidate always gets the job”. For advocates of the libertarian conception, this principle 
is absolute: the best candidate always has priority over everyone else. In contrast, for advocates of 
egalitarian conceptions of equality of opportunity, this principle is applicable only under certain 
conditions. The best candidate has priority only in cases where all individuals have fair access to 
qualifications. For the former, fairness of access is satisfied as soon as all individuals have access 
to qualifications, whereas for the latter, equality of access is genuine once all individuals who 
compete for an advantaged social position face (at least approximately) the same obstacles. For 
a detailed comparison of the different conceptions of equal opportunities, see Cavanagh (2002), 
Squires (2006, pp. 473–477) and Swift (2001).
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Equality of opportunity and compensation for inequality
The basic objective of the second principle associated with the idea of 
equality of opportunity (the “levelling the playing field” principle) is to neutral-
ise, reduce, mitigate or even eliminate both the potential benefits of those who 
might be in an advantaged position as well as the potential barriers to those 
who might be disadvantaged. In an egalitarian interpretation, equal opportuni-
ties should enable any individual, irrespective of any morally arbitrary factors, 
to achieve a fair starting point in the process of competing for advantaged social 
positions, as it would be both unjust and unfair, as Larry Temkin points out, to 
have a situation “when one person is worse off than another through no fault or 
choice of her own” (Temkin, 1993, p. 13).7
This principle therefore has two separate objectives, which are connect-
ed with ensuring the fairness of the non-discrimination principle: (1) the nega-
tive objective, and (2) the positive objective. On the one hand, the levelling the 
playing field principle aims to neutralise, reduce, mitigate or eliminate potential 
benefits of those individuals who are in a better or privileged position, as well as 
the potential barriers of those who are – one way or another – disadvantaged; 
on the other hand, the positive objective associated with the levelling the play-
ing field principle ensures that any individual – regardless of morally arbitrary 
factors such as gender, race, religion, socioeconomic status, etc. – achieves a 
fair starting point in the process of competition for advanced social positions. 
According to this interpretation, as T. M. Scanlon states, inequality should “not 
disrupt the fairness of on-going competition” (Scanlon, 2003, p. 205).
Moreover, the ideal of equal opportunities needs to distinguish between 
two of its basic elements: (1) the political element, and (2) the social element. 
Providing access based on the principle of non-discrimination is part of the 
“political” element of civic equality, while the compensation programmes we 
associate with the principle of levelling the playing field are part of the “social” 
element of civic equality. The political element of equal opportunities is nega-
tive, as it does not require any material or financial resources from wider society 
for its provision. In this sense, its value lies in the absence of formal obstacles, 
e.g., non-discrimination. Unlike the political or formal element of equality of 
opportunity, where the basic criterion is that careers are open to talent, the 
7 The relationship between the two principles of equal opportunities remains open here. Are the 
principle of non-discrimination and that of levelling the playing field overlapping, complementary, 
in tension with each other, or even mutually exclusive? In any case, the relationship between the 
two principles cannot be thought of as a “weak” or “robust” ideal of equality of opportunity, but as 
two separate principles, given the fact that the non-discrimination principle deals with the issue 
of universal access, while the levelling the playing field principle ensures fair access to the process 
of competition for advanced social positions.
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“social” element of equal opportunities is associated with redistribution and 
various compensatory programmes. Fair equality of opportunity, as Rawls em-
phasises, “is said to require not merely that public offices and social positions be 
open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them” 
(Rawls, 2001, p. 43).
The compensatory programmes most commonly associated with fair 
equality of opportunity are usually justified with two separate arguments: (1) 
the argument regarding initial positions (the equidistance argument), and (2) 
the argument regarding the results of a process of advantaged social positions 
(the equivalence argument). The first argument is essentially a classical argu-
ment associated with a broadly liberal conception of equality of opportunity. 
Given the fact that individuals’ initial positions are unequal, compensatory 
programmes are primarily aimed at the reduction of initial inequality or at 
equalising the initial conditions associated with equidistance. The second argu-
ment associated with compensatory programmes is primarily focused on the 
compensation for inequality that arises out of the process of competition for 
advanced social positions. The first group of compensatory programmes is jus-
tified by the arbitrary nature of moral criteria for selection, e.g., talent, while the 
second group aims to reduce, neutralise, mitigate or eliminate inequalities aris-
ing from the process of competing for advantaged social positions. Whereas the 
principle of non-discrimination ensures that morally arbitrary factors have no 
impact on or do not limit individuals in the process of competing for advanced 
social positions, the levelling the playing field principle aims to ensure fair con-
ditions for the implementation of the non-discrimination principle. However, 
things are further complicated with the introduction of multiculturalist claims 
for the accommodation and recognition of cultural diversity, which are prem-
ised on compensating for inequality arising out of cultural diversity.
Equality of opportunity and cultural diversity
The standard multicultural hypothesis
Over the last two decades, advocates of multiculturalism have success-
fully challenged the liberal orthodoxy in its three core assumptions associated 
with civic equality: (1) that (national) cultures are largely homogeneous; (2) that 
culture is irrelevant in considerations of the justice of the basic institutional 
framework of a plurally diverse polity; and (3) that equal treatment and civic 
equality are coextensive. However, despite a new sensitivity towards considera-
tions of cultural diversity, advocates of multiculturalism have largely ignored a 
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number of tensions, problems and challenges stemming from their invocation 
of equality of opportunity as the basis for the recognition and accommodation 
of diversity. Two basic dimensions neglected by the advocates of multicultural-
ism can be identified here: (1) the distributive specification of accommodation 
(how accommodation is to be carried out); and (2) the agent-relative specifi-
cation of accommodation (who is the primary target of accommodation). As 
Bhikhu Parekh emphasises, […] the concept of equal opportunity [...] needs 
to be interpreted in a culturally sensitive manner. Opportunity is a subject-
dependent concept in the sense that a facility, or resource, or a course of action 
is only a mute and passive possibility for an individual if she lacks the capacity, 
the cultural disposition or the necessary cultural background to take advantage 
of it. (Parekh, 2000, p. 241)
At the same time, the standard liberal view also entails a normative com-
mitment to equal civic respect for diversity, i.e., respect for different conceptions 
of the good that citizens, as free and equal members of a polity, might hold and 
that arise from their exercising their basic rights. Part of this commitment is the 
acknowledgement of individuals’ different conceptions of the good, including 
values, ideals and other doctrinal beliefs. The fact of reasonable pluralism, writes 
Rawls, refers to circumstances “that reflect the fact that in a modern democratic 
society citizens affirm different, and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable, 
though reasonable, comprehensive doctrines in the light of which they under-
stand their conceptions of the good” (Rawls, 2001, p. 84). The commitment to 
equal civic respect for diversity presupposes that all citizens within a particu-
lar political community should treated as equals, regardless of their ascriptive or 
conscience-based characteristics, such as race, class, sex, language, religion or any 
other differentiating characteristic (the requirement of equal consideration).
To summarise: the standard liberal conception of civic equality and its 
commitment to equality of opportunity can be subsumed under the assertion 
that equal opportunities associated with the uniform treatment approach are a 
sufficient requirement of justice. In this interpretation, equal treatment and civ-
ic equality are coextensive. As Brian Barry points out, “justice is guaranteed by 
equal opportunities” (Barry, 2001, p. 32). In this respect, Nils Holtug claims that 
“if a certain rule applies equally to everyone and gives them identical choice 
sets, then people have equal opportunities” (Holtug, 2008, p. 84).
Nevertheless, advocates of multiculturalism have maintained that stand-
ard conceptions of citizenship are either insensitive towards differences stem-
ming from individuals’ cultural identity or outright discriminatory and oppres-
sive. The standard multiculturalist position is based on a number of interrelated 
claims over the recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity: (1) that 
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national minorities, immigrants and indigenous peoples have a legitimate in-
terest in a secure and stable cultural context; (2) that claims for accommodation 
of cultural diversity are based on justice; and (3) that group rights are the most 
viable means to assist non-dominant minority groups in their claims for the 
recognition and accommodation of their cultural differences.
As proponents of multiculturalism have argued (e.g., Kymlicka, 1995; 
Modood, 2007; Parekh 2000), neither the expansion of status nor the expan-
sion of entitlement associated with the classical liberal egalitarian conception of 
civic equality has been sufficiently inclusive in confronting claims for the rec-
ognition and accommodation of cultural diversity. As they have emphasised, 
the liberal egalitarian conception of civic equality and its uniform treatment 
approach towards cultural diversity is insensitive to the claims of minority 
groups for recognition and accommodation of their cultural differences, as it 
(1) fails to recognise the legitimate interest of national minorities, immigrants 
and indigenous peoples in a stable cultural context, (2) lacks the means to com-
pensate adequately for individuals’ unequal circumstances, and (relatedly) (3) 
insufficiently protect the interests of culturally disadvantaged minority groups.
This leads to the assertion that members of non-dominant minority 
groups are undeservedly disadvantaged in terms of access to a stable and secure 
cultural environment, which is instrumental for the cultivation of a “context 
of choice” (the context of choice requirement). One of the main devices used 
to substantiate claims for the accommodation and recognition of diversity has 
been built on the idea of fairness. Multiculturalist claims for the accommoda-
tion of diversity have been argued largely as compensation for the underserved 
disadvantages of members of minorities or of immigrants, and have rested on a 
specific form of argument based on fairness, i.e., “the fairness argument”.
The fairness argument
The standard conception of fair equality of opportunity is therefore 
based on a set of (interconnected) commitments that are intertwined with one 
another in the construction of an argument that would legitimate the compen-
sation for individuals’ unequal initial positions within the process of competi-
tion for advantaged social positions:
(c1)  an advantaged social position is to be granted to the best candidate (the 
assumption of a meritocracy-based conception of excellence);
(c2)  the distribution of an advantaged social position according to merit is 
mutually beneficial to both the winner and the loser (the assumption of 
mutual advantage);
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(c3)  the process of competition for advantaged social positions should only 
take into account those aspects of an individual’s characteristics that are 
the result of his or her effort or choices, and not those factors for which 
s/he has no merit or is not responsible (the voluntaristic assumption of 
the nature of the currency of equality);
(c4)  the individual is solely responsible for the outcome of the process of 
competing for an advantaged social position and the associated trans-
formation of an opportunity into an advantage (the assumption of the 
instrumental nature of transitivity);
(c5)  the rules of competition should be associated exclusively with the per-
formance of tasks associated with the process of competition for advan-
taged social positions (the assumption of the excellence of the process of 
competition for advantaged social positions);
(c6)  inequality arising from the process of competition for advantaged social 
positions is legitimate insofar as access to the process of competition is 
open (the assumption of the legitimacy of resulting inequality);
(c7)  the result of the process of competition for advantaged social positions 
is just as fair as the process of competition is fair (the assumption of the 
fairness of the process of competition for advantaged social positions);
(c8)  differences between individuals that are independent of individuals’ 
choices should be neutralised and the undeserved disadvantages (some-
how) compensated for (the assumption of the equality of the process of 
competition).
The validity of any conception of equal opportunities that claims to be 
fair therefore depends on a number of interconnected assumptions, as the basic 
challenge of equal opportunities is therefore how to ensure that competition for 
advantaged social positions is fair, and that inequalities resulting from the pro-
cess of competition are legitimate. This assertion opens up a range of separate 
questions that any conception of equal opportunities must answer.
The nature of cultural diversity and the “currency problem”
Among the most important aspects distinguishing different conceptions 
of equality of opportunity is the very nature of cultural diversity and the forms 
of potential inequality associated with it: (1) those forms of inequality that are 
beyond the individual’s will (the involuntary aspect of inequality), and (2) those 
forms of inequality that are part of the individual’s choices. The distinction of 
factors that should be counted among individuals’ circumstances and those 
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that can be included within the category of individuals’ choices is one of the 
basic theoretical foundations of egalitarian liberalism, as it distinguishes be-
tween different conceptions of equality and equal educational opportunities, 
distinguished primarily by two separate disagreements: (1) “which aspects of 
individual behavior are beyond one’s control and can be attributed to the effect 
of circumstances”, and (2) “whether the same conditions should be provided in 
part or in its entirety” (Roemer, 1998).
While there are a number of different versions of the fairness argument, 
they all share a common ideal, as Samuel Scheffler argues, i.e., “inequalities in 
the advantages that people enjoy are acceptable if they derive from the choices 
that people have voluntarily made, but that inequalities deriving from uncho-
sen features of people’s circumstances are unjust” (Scheffler, 2003, p. 5). This 
idea, as Shlomi Segall emphasises, is based on the assumption that it is “unfair 
for one person to be worse off than another due to reasons beyond her con-
trol” (Segall, 2008, p. 10). In this interpretation, as Andrew Mason points out, 
a person can legitimately be required “to bear the costs (or allowed to enjoy 
the benefits) of those consequences of her behavior the production of which 
lies within her control but not those the production of which lies beyond it” 
(Mason, 2001, p. 763). A basic problem that arises here is to determine “which 
factors should be counted among people’s circumstances and which should be 
subsumed within the category of choice” (Scheffler, 2005, p. 6).
The fundamental question therefore revolves around the distinction be-
tween two normative sources of diversity: (1) chance-based diversity, and (2) 
choice-based diversity. The former is a matter of chance or circumstance, i.e., 
the unchosen natural and social conditions associated with one’s identity, while 
the latter is a matter of individual choice. As Will Kymlicka firmly points out, 
“[t]he distinction between choices and circumstances is in fact absolutely cen-
tral to the liberal project” (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 186). Multiculturalist claims for 
equality of opportunity emphasise that cultural diversity needs to be compen-
sated for as a matter of fairness. They substantiate this claim with the assertion 
that cultural diversity of non-dominant minority groups qualifies as a form of 
“unfair disadvantage” compared to members of the majority culture. Given the 
fact that this is a central controversy between liberal and multiculturalist con-
ceptions of equal opportunities, it needs further clarification.
Objections to multiculturalist claims for fairness
Both the fairness argument and the classification of cultural diversity as 
a form of “unfair disadvantage” have been severely criticised by advocates of 
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egalitarian liberalism. Two prevailing objections have been advanced: (1) that 
a differentiated conception of civic equality is inconsistent with an egalitarian 
conception of citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity (the civic 
equality objection), and (2) that cultural differences cannot be equated with dis-
advantages stemming from brute bad luck, e.g., a handicap (the non-equiva-
lence objection).
The civic equality objection revolves around the criticism that multicul-
turalist claims for both recognition and accommodation of cultural differences 
leads to a de-universalisation of civic equality. The multiculturalist conception 
of civic equality includes – in some interpretations – a decisive rejection of 
citizenship as free and equal membership in a polity. In particular, the politics 
of difference and the conceptions of citizenship that go beyond a conception of 
civic equality based on the uniform treatment approach, e.g., the conception 
of differentiated citizenship (Young, 1990) and the conception of multicultural 
citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995), are inconsistent with a conception of civic equal-
ity that grants each and every member of a polity an equal set of entitlements. 
While advocates of the politics of difference claim that differentiated rights are 
a corrective to the uniform treatment approach, its critics decisively argue that 
this move is a significant departure from a conception of citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity.
The second set of objections revolves around the characterisation of cul-
tural diversity as “unfair disadvantage”. As Brian Barry emphasises in Culture 
and Equality, A disability – for example, a lack of physical mobility due to in-
jury or disease – supports a strong prima facie claim to compensation because 
it limits the opportunity to engage in activities that others are able to engage in. 
In contrast, the effect of some distinctive belief or preference is to bring about a 
certain pattern of choices from among the set of opportunities that are available 
to all who are similarly placed physically or financially. The position of some-
body who is unable to drive a car as a result of some physical disability is totally 
different from that of somebody who is unable to drive a car because doing so 
would be contrary to the tenets of his or her religion. (Barry, 2001, pp. 36–37)
In this interpretation, equating the two forms of diversity is both logi-
cally unacceptable and morally wrong. It turns out to be logically unacceptable 
because we cannot equate a dietary limit to eating foods that include gluten 
with the religious observation of not eating foods containing gluten. By equat-
ing a chance-based form of diversity with a choice-based form of diversity we 
commit the fallacy of equivalence. In fact, this equation is morally wrong as it 
is premised on the non-voluntaristic nature of cultural diversity. This observa-
tion emphasises the fact that disability and cultural diversity are not equivalent, 
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as well as the fact that the liberal conception of civic equality and its model of 
citizenship as a political conception of the person is premised on the volunta-
rist understanding of religious and other forms of conscience-based diversity. 
Nevertheless, an interesting trend can be discerned in controversies over cul-
tural diversity. On the one hand, there has been little disagreement over the 
centrality of cultural diversity in contemporary discussions of multicultural-
ism: it seems that both liberalism and multiculturalism share the assumption 
that inequalities in the advantages people share are acceptable if they result 
from individuals’ deliberate choices, whereas inequalities arising from indi-
viduals’ unchosen circumstances and conditions are unjust. On the other hand, 
despite the convergence of opinion on the injustice of inequalities that stem 
from individuals’ circumstances, it remains of crucial importance to determine 
which aspects can be subsumed under chance-based diversity and which under 
choice-based diversity.
Conclusion: the paradox(es) of equal opportunity
Disagreements over the fundamental principles associated with equality 
of opportunity, criticism of the inefficiency of policies and strategies aiming to 
ensure a fair process of competition for advantaged social positions, as well as 
the various objections regarding its alleged unfairness, open a number of ques-
tions that need to be answered by any conception, e.g., motivational questions 
(Why should individuals’ opportunities be equalised?); procedural questions 
(What are the principled foundations of any process claiming to be based on 
equal opportunities?); genealogical questions (What is a fair starting position to 
compete for advantaged social positions?); substantive questions (What are the 
criteria for equalising individuals’ prospects?); taxonomic questions (What type 
of disadvantage is eligible for compensation?); compensatory questions (How 
should the process of equalising opportunities be carried out?), etc. Further-
more, without clarifying a number of variables associated with these questions, 
e.g., opportunity, equality, non-discrimination, obstacles, fairness, responsibil-
ity, chance, choice, excellence, deservedness, effort, talent, merit, inequality, 
etc., the idea of equal opportunities remains – as Andrew Mason eloquently 
puts it – simply a “radically contradictory [...] piece of political rhetoric” (Ma-
son, 2006, p. 1). As it turns out, providing an answer to any of these questions 
becomes part of the problem and not the solution.
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